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UTAH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN TIERRA CORPORATION et al, ] 
Plaintiffs-Appellants ] 
vs ] 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH, ] 
Defendant-Appellee ] 
i PETITION FOR REHEARING 
| Docket No. 9000186 
Pursuant to the Provisions of Rule 35, Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Defendant-Appellee petitions 
the Court for rehearing in the above-entitled matter. The 
decision of the Court was filed May 5, 1992. In that 
decision the Court overlooked or misapprehended points of 
fact and law and thus erred in the following particulars: 
1. The Court failed to consider the uncertainty 
its ruling will create for future "statute of 
limitations" issues in "class action" cases. 
2. The Court improperly found the statute of 
limitation to be tolled even before the theory of 
recovery these plaintiffs advocate was filed. 
3. The Court improperly concluded that some of 
these Plaintiffs for some of their claims would 
have been included in the Call "class", when in 
fact the impact fee was paid after this case was 
filed and was appealed. 
4. The Court misapplied and misconstrued cases 
from the federal court system. 
I 
THE COURT'S DECISION ADDS UNCERTAINTY, 
INEQUITY AND CONFUoION TO THE LAW FOR FUTURE CASES 
There is an ancient maxim: "Hindsight is always better 
than foresight." This is certainly true of judicial 
decisions. In carefully examining what did happen in this 
case, the Court failed to overlook the impact of its 
announced decision on future cases. 
One of the holdings of the Court can be succinctly 
stated: The statute of limitation is tolled in favor of the 
claims of putative class members until the appellate court 
expressly resolves the "class action" issues. In this case, 
the tolling of the statute extended from February 1978 to 
July 198 6 over EIGHT YEARS, which was double the amount of 
time (4-years) the Court has now stated the applicable 
statute of limitation for this case. 
In this case Judge Winder DENIED "class action" 
certification in April 1978. Under the Court's holding, the 
statute was tolled and remained tolled until the Call III 
(727 P. 2d 180, Utah 1986) was announced in July 1986. What 
would have happened if the Call plaintiffs had not appealed? 
Would the statute continue to be tolled? What if the Call 
plaintiffs had only appealed up through Call II (614 P. 2d 
1257 (Utah 1980) and following remand of that case, had 
merely tried the case and let stand the trial court's 
determination on the merits of the case? Would the statute 
be tolled? Perhaps; perhaps not. The defect in the Court's 
decision is that the answers to these rhetorical questions 
are simply not answerable. 
The Court's decision effective in hindsight in 
resolving this case merely leads to uncertainty and 
injustice for future cases. The Court has justified its 
ruling on issues such as "judicial economy" and "equity". 
The City of West Jordan submits that when the Court properly 
analyzes the practical effect of its decision, neither of 
those two justifying reasons will be served. 
For example, if the "class action" certification was 
denied in Call at the trial court level, the putative class 
members have several options: they can seek to intervene or 
they can file their own actions. This Court has now given 
them a third option: to wait. Now there is no incentive for 
them to file their actions, because the statute of 
limitation is tolled. OR IS IT? Under the Court's announced 
ruling, it is tolled if there is an appeal. But at that 
early stage even following remand as in Call II there is 
no guarantee that there will be an appeal of the "class 
action" issue. Thus, the putative class members MUST file 
their separate actions or promptly move to intervene; those 
class members cannot rely on the tolling of the statute 
because the statute is tolled only if the representative 
parties choose to appeal. Thus, the issue of "judicial 
economy" is certainly not legitimately served. 
Similarly the "equity" issue. The defendant in the 
class action certainly isn't "placed on notice" as to the 
claims of the putative class members in such a situation. 
And there certainly isn't any "equity" in a situation where 
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the running (or tolling) of the statute is strictly a 
function of the attitudes and legal judgment of the named 
parties' counsel, as he attempts to represent unnamed 
parties not before the court. The parties, and even future 
parties, to litigation or future litigation, ought to be 
able to know whether or not the statute is running or not. 
Under the Court's announced ruling, such is not the case. 
Those parties simply do not know. If the plaintiff (in the 
unsuccessful class action certification) appeals the denial, 
then the statute is tolled; if the plaintiff does not appeal 
that denial, the statute is running (ostensibly from the 
date of the trial court's denial of certification). Although 
in this case it is easy to discern that the plaintiffs in 
Call appealed, it is impossible to tell in future cases 
whether the plaintiff in a case will appeal or not. It is 
impossible to tell whether the appeal will be on the "class 
action" question. 
This uncertainty raises serious ethical and 
jurisprudential issues. Most significant is the fact that 
the running (or tolling) should be determinable, at any 
moment of time, and not be contingent upon the future 
actions of a private litigant attempting to represent 
"class" members which the attorney has no authority to 
represent. [Once the "class" certification has been denied, 
the plaintiffs ought not to seek to represent parties not 
before the court. To allow them to continue to do so borders 
on unprofessional solicitation.] In such a situation, is the 
verdict at the trial court "for sale". Those trial court 
proceedings could last several years; in the Call 
litigation, the case was tried following two appeals on 
the merits and two interlocutory appeals in late 1983, 
almost five years after the original filing of the 
litigation. If no appeal was to be taken following the 
trial, the case would be over and the claims of the putative 
class members would have been barred by the 4-year statute 
of limitation. 
This undesirable situation is illustrated by two 
hypotheticals: #1. Let us assume the Call plaintiffs had 
prevailed in the trial court on the merits of their claim 
and proved the impact fee, as applied to those plaintiffs, 
was "unreasonable" and the trial court ordered the entirety 
of the fee refunded. The plaintiffs wouldn't have grounds to 
appeal because those plaintiffs received everything they 
sought in the litigation. They having won shouldn't be 
allowed to appeal strictly on the denial of the "class" 
certification: why should those successful plaintiffs be 
allowed to prolong litigation merely because their attorney 
wants to represent more parties, ostensibly to increase his 
professional fee? Now, the dilemma. After five years of 
litigation, the plaintiffs have prevailed on the merits, but 
the statute of limitations would bar the claims of 
similarly-situated plaintiffs who have not filed. Should 
plaintiffs' counsel be tempted by the prospect of holding 
out for a settlement in excess of the actual judgment in 
favor of the named parties? Should the defendant in that 
case be held hostage by the fact that if there is an appeal, 
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the statute is tolled; if, however, the case is settled and 
there is no appeal, the statute of limitations runs and the 
similar claims of other parties are cut off? 
The second hypothectical: what is the result if the 
basis for the denial of class action certification is that 
the trial court finds the representative parties will 
inadequately represent the interests of the putative class 
members? Should the statute be tolled in that situation (and 
thus benefit those class members) when the trial court has 
ruled the representative parties should NOT represent the 
class members? Certainly not! And yet such is the result 
allowed by this Court's announced ruling. 
It is incredible that the Court would fashion a rule 
which leads to such inequitable results. 
The rule followed by the United States Supreme Court 
that (the statute is tolled only until the trial court 
denies class action certification) does not suffer that 
defect. It should be followed in this case. 
II 
THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE 
"NO PUBLIC HEARING11 CLAIM WAS NOT FILED 
UNTIL MARCH 1981, WHEN THE STATUTE HAD 
ALREADY EXPIRED FOR MANY OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS 
Although the original complaint in Call was filed in 
February 1978, the claim that "there was no public hearing 
preceding the adoption of the impact fee ordinance" was not 
filed until March 1981! By that time, the 4-year statute of 
limitations had already run against many of the Plaintiffs' 
claims. The Call complaint did NOT contain the "no public 
hearing" allegations until the trial court allowed an 
"amended" complaint to be filed in proceedings on remand 
following Call II. 
One of the major justifications in tolling the statute 
of limitations as advanced by the Plaintiffs and even 
accepted by the Court is that the Defendant is "placed on 
notice" as to the nature of the substantive claim which is 
advanced by the representative parties. The Court's ruling, 
in essence, resurrects the then dead claims and literally 
"turns back the clock". Such should not be the case! To 
allow this result in this case will merely encourage 
litigants to make every case a "class action": to do so 
costs so little to allege (even if unsuccessful) and tolls 
the statute of limitations for unnamed parties to the 
original litigation even for causes of action which were not 
at issue in the original litigation 1 Such a result cannot be 
condoned. 
The Court should not allow the "clock to be turned 
backwards", but should rule that the statute is tolled in 
favor of the class members ONLY AFTER THE DEFENDANT WAS 
PLACED ON NOTICE AS TO THE NATURE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE CLAIM 
UPON WHICH THESE PLAINTIFFS SEEK TO RECOVER; to hold 
otherwise obviously defeats the legitimate public policy 
issues justifying statutes of limitation. If this is done, 
it has the effect of barring most of the Plaintiffs' claims, 
as shown below: 
Date Subdivision Plaintiff Months prior 
to March '81 
Nov 7 6 Nottingham Moor Arnold Development 51+ 
Feb 77 McHeather American Tierra 48+ 
May 77 Cathleen American Tierra 45+ 
Jun 77 Jordan Grove #5 American Tierra 44+ 
Sep 77 Dimondville Arnold Development 41+ 
Aug 78 Lessley Estates Brighton Builders 30+ 
Aug 78 Linsey Estates Arnold Development 3 0+ 
Aug 78 Vista Via Covecrest Properties 30+ 
[Note that recovery by R & D Engineers for impact fees paid 
for Magic Valley #2 subdivision was barred by the statute of 
limitations apart from this analysis and is not considered 
further in this brief.] The "months" column indicates the 
number of months from the time the Developer paid the impact 
fee until March 4, 1981, when the amended complaint was 
filed in Call. [These calculations assume that the impact 
fees were paid on the last calendar day of the month the 
date most favorable to the Plaintiffs.] That coupled with 
the 15-month period [from 23 July 1986 when Call III was 
announced to 4 November 1987 when the instant complaints 
were filed] effectively pushes most of the claims beyond the 
48-month (4-year) statute of limitation applicable for these 
claims. [The issue of whether the three developers which 
paid an impact fee in August 1978 after the Call case had 
been filed, decided at the trial court level and appealed to 
the Supreme Court will be discussed at Point III, below.] 
This "placed on notice" issue is significant, 
especially in the context that the Call plaintiffs 
originally (through Call I and Call II) maintained that 
there was "no statutory authority" for the impact fee 
ordinance. Only after Call II was announced did the 
plaintiffs come up with the "no public hearing" issue. [The 
Call plaintiffs had their "one shot" at the City to come up 
with the reasons why the West Jordan impact fee ordinance 
was invalid. They having failed in their attempt to 
establish the invalidity of the ordinance on their first 
attempt (Call I) should not have been allowed to amend 
their complaint to allege new grounds for the facial 
invalidity of the ordinance, when those should have been 
raised in the original complaint prior to Call I. That they 
were allowed to do so, successfully under Call III, does 
violence to the concept of "judicial economy" and the idea 
that a party must file all causes of action arising out of a 
single incident or forego pursuing those unfiled claims. 
Rule 18, U.R.Civ.P. 
If the Court is inclined to "toll" the statute of 
limitations, the tolling period should begin no earlier than 
the date (4 March 1981) on which the Defendant received 
notice of the substantive claims upon which the Plaintiffs 
now seek to recover. The Court should not "roll back the 
clock" to resurrect claims which had been already barred. 
Ill 
THE DEVELOPERS WHO PAID THE IMPACT FEES 
IN AUGUST 1978 SHOULD NOT BE DEEMED TO 
HAVE BEEN MEMBERS OF THE PUTATIVE CLASS 
The Court in its opinion mistakenly assumes that the 
Plaintiffs which paid fees in August 1978 would have been 
members of the putative class in Call. The original Call 
complaint was filed in February 1978. The class action 
issues were decided by the trial court (Judge Winder) in 
April 1978; summary judgment was granted in favor of the 
City on the merits of the claim in May 1978 and the case was 
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court in a timely fashion. [The 
plaintiffs' Appellants' Brief was filed in August 1978.] 
Thus, the case was well under-way and decided by the time 
the Plaintiffs paid their impact fees in August 1978. Those 
putative class members who pay their impact fee after the 
case is filed should not be construed to be class members. 
There must be a finality a definiteness a predictability 
in the law. Under the Court's ruling (which gives them 
benefits as though they were not only described in the class 
action allegations but also as though the class was actually 
certified to include them) there would never be a statute of 
limitation, because the size of the class was constantly 
expanding, as new parties paid their fees. 
In that context, it is interesting to imagine the 
effect if the result had been different: for example, what 
if the trial court had certified the class, but found 
nevertheless that the ordinance was valid as in Call I? Had 
there been no appeal and merely a judgment on the merits (or 
had the proceedings terminated immediately following the 
Call I decision), those future class members would be bound 
by the decision upholding the facial validity of the 
Ordinance. As class members of the putative class they would 
be bound by principles of res judicata from asserting claims 
(including the "no public hearing" issue) which could have 
been asserted in Call I but which weren't. Thus, we have the 
anomalous situation that a potential plaintiff is barred 
from asserting a claim a claim that wasn't even litigated-
—even before his cause of action arises. If that had been 
the situation from the Call I decision, it would be 
interesting to see if the August 1978 would be so anxious to 
find shelter within the "class" which was never certified. 
For such issues there ought to be a mutuality of 
result: a future party-litigant ought not be gain an 
advantage while the opposing party suffers from a 
disadvantage, 
IV 
THE COURT'S DECISION INCORRECTLY RELIES UPON 
DISTINGUISHABLE FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS AND CREATES 
AN APPROACH INCONSISTENT WITH APPLICABLE CASE LAW 
The Court's decision cites to four federal court 
decisions on the issue of the tolling of the statute pending 
appeal. Each of those cases is distinguishable from the 
present situation. 
In West Haven School District vs Owens-Corning 
Fiberglas, 721 F.Supp. 1547 (D.Conn. 1988) the former action 
which tolled the statute involved a class which was 
certified. In the instant case, the putative "class" was 
NEVER CERTIFIED. 
In Jimenez vs Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1975), 
the putative class members sought to intervene promptly 
after the denial of the class action certification. The 
appealed issue was the denial of leave to intervene, not 
the specific denial of class action status. This point is 
made clear in Footnote #12 of the decision, 523 F.2d at 696, 
where the Seventh Circuit wrote: 
There was no occasion for the Court to 
consider any question of tolling after 
refusal to certify in a case in which 
the absent class members r^ ade no timely 
effort to assert their rights directly. 
523 F.2d at 696. Emphasis added. 
Davis vs Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 600 F.Supp. 1312 
(D.Maryland 1985) should be cited for the proposition that 
although the statute may be tolled during the pendency of 
the appeal, the statute is NOT tolled even during the 
appeal period if the representative claims are so vague 
and ambiguous as to fail to give the defendant adequate 
notice. When applied to the instant case, Davis stands for 
the principle that the tolling period should not begin until 
4 March 1981. 
Byrd vs Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 675 F.Supp. 342 
(D.Miss. 1987) is factually distinguishable on several 
points. First, the class action was certified originally by 
the trial court. Only after several redefinitions and 
amendments effected by the trial court and the appellate 
courts to that certification did the trial court rule the 
statute began to run. The court expressly refused to extend 
the tolling while subsequent appeals were pursued. Indeed, 
the court wrote of a situation which is closely analogous, 
when correctly analyzed, to the case at bar and the Call 
case: 
Inasmuch as the Fifth Circuit did not 
disturb on appeal the district court's 
redefinition of the class to exclude 
black males, the court construes the 
appropriate final order to be the 
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari on 
Payne I in 1978. At that point in timef 
the plaintiffs in this action were put 
on notice that their rights were not 
being represented by the class action 
plaintiffs in Payne. If the plaintiffs 
wished to intervene in Payne or to file 
separate actionsf the appropriate time 
to do so was after Payne I. Since the 
Fifth Circuit ruling did not reverse or 
otherwise disturb the district courts 
order of December 8, 1976 redefining the 
class in Payne to exclude black males, 
plaintiffs had no basis for delaying 
their intervention in Payne at the time 
to seek the certification of a subclass 
of black males. Nor were plaintiffs 
justified in assuming the Fifth Circuit 
might later require certification of a 
subclass of black males when Payne went 
up on appeal once again. 
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Howe argues in dissent: that the statute began to run when 
Call I was announced (December 26, 1979). 
[As an addendum to this Brief is a photocopy of Pages 
3 3 through 35, inclusively of Plaintiff's original Brief to 
the Utah Supreme Court, filed in Call I by Valden 
Livingston. The entire Brief should be on file in the 
Supreme Court records under Docket No. 15908. There may be 
an inadequate record presently before the Court as to 
exactly what was argued in Call I. However, that failure 
should fall solely upon the Plaintiffs. It is the Plaintiffs 
who are claiming entitlement to the tolling of the statute. 
Those Plaintiffs should prove both the factual and the legal 
bases to entitle them to the tolling they claim.] 
Thus, the four federal court decisions cited by the 
Court to justify the extended tolling of the statute are 
inappropriately analyzed. Those cases do not overrule the 
applicable principles of non-tolling as announced by the 
United States Supreme Court in American Pipe and in Crown, 
Cork: that the tolling continues only until the trial court 
entertains a motion to strip the action of its class action 
character. The Davis opinion quotes from the decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in United Airlines vs McDonald, 
432 U.S. 385 at 394: 
In short, as soon as it became clear to 
the [plaintiffs] that the interests of 
the unnamed class members would no 
longer be protected by the named class 
representatives, [they should have] 
moved to intervene to protect those 
interests. 
675 F.Supp at 348. Bracketed material in original. 
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Respect 
STEJPHEN e-lIOHER 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 
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City; Mel S Martin, 900 Kermecott Building, 10 East South 
Temple Street, Salt Lake City; and Wallace R Bennett, 17 2 3 
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prosecute the action vigorously. Mersay v. First Republic Corp., 
43 F.R.D. 465 (1965). Both elements are present in this case. 
POINT V 
THIS ACTION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED 
AS A CLASS ACTION AS THE PRE-
REQUISITES OF RULE 23(b) ARE PRESENT 
In order to bring a class action, the plaintiffs must 
satisfy all four of the requirements of Rule 23(a). However, 
plaintiffs need meet only one of the requirements of Rule 2 3(b) * 
Albertsons, Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 503 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 
1974). 
A
» Rule 23(b) (1) (A) — Inconsistent: or Varying Adjudications 
With Respect to Individual Members of the Class Would 
Create a Risk of Establishing Incompatible Standards of 
Conduct for Defendant. 
The focus of Rule 23(b((l)(A) is to protect the interest 
of the party opposing the class. George v. United Federal Savings & 
Loan, 63 F.R.D. 631 (1974). The purpose of the Rule is to protect 
a defendant from the legal quagmire which might result if one court 
were to order defendant to take certain action which another court 
orders the same defendant not to take. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 
62 F.R.D. 124 (1973). 
The Advisory Committee notes to the 1966 Amendments 
to the FederaL Rules of Civil Procedure state: 
Clause (A): One person may have rights 
against/ or be under dutic-3 toward, numerous 
persons constituH-,9 ": class, and be so 
positioned that conflicting or varying 
~ " indications in lawsuits with individual 
members of the class might establish incom-
patible standards to govern his conduct. 
The class action device can be used -.•••'••'-' 
f^ectively to obviate the actual or 
::tual cilemmn which would thus confront 
» party opposing the class. The matter 
I'ooi' stated thus: "The felt necessity 
* a class action is greatest when the 
_; arts are called upon to order or sanction 
the alteration of the status quo in circum-
• ances such that a large number of persons 
*•: in a position to call on a single 
. • -"so" to alter the status quo, or to 
•pi a.in if it is altered, and the 
*sibility exists that [the] actor might 
called upon to act in inconsistent ways." 
Louisell & Hazard, Pleading and Procedure: 
State and Federal 719 (1962); see Supreme 
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 
366-67 (1921) To illustrate: Separate 
actions by individuals against a municipality 
to declare a bond issue invalid or condition~ 
or limit it, to preventT~or limit the making 
of a particular appropriation or to compel 
or invalidate an assessment, might create 
a risk of inconsistent or varying determina-
tions. In the same way, individual litiga-
tions of the rights and duties of riparian 
owners, or of landowners1 rights and duties 
respecting a claimed nuisance, could create 
a possibility of incompatible adjudications. 
Actions by or against a class provide a 
ready and fair means of achieving unitary 
adjudication. [Emphasis added.] Notes of 
Advisory Committee on Rules, 39 F.R.D. 100 (1966). 
It appears that the present case falls squarely v/ithin the Rule. 
See also, Horst v, Guy, 21 1 N.W.2d 723 (J; 973 N.D.). 
I n a s i ir •.. •.  I a i vf e i i i, c 1 a s 5 > a c t ,i„ o n s h a v e b e e i i u p h e 1 d u n d e r 
Rule 2 3 (b { (1) (A) on claims that, a utility has overcharged its 
customers. Cass C I ^  r Uic _ / JMort^western Public Service Co. , 
1° P. !;.f-vrv.2d 118 7 (1974) . 
Finally, identical cases to the present one wherein 
subdividers have brought suit against a municipality seeking to 
have an ordinance requiring dedication of land or payment of money 
declared invalid, have been maintained as a class action. Citv of 
Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So.2d 363 (Ala. 1978); 
Cimarron Corp. v. Bd. of County Commissioners, 563 P.2d 946 (Colo. 
1977). 
CONCLUSION 
Summary Judgment should be granted in favor of 
plaintiffs and this case should be certified as a plaintiff class 
action. 
DATED this 18th day of August, 1978. 
VALDEN P. LIVINGSTON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellants was served upon Nick J. Colessides, attorney 
for respondent/ by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, this JlJ day of 
August, 1978. 
